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Abstract 
The rich ethnic diversity in the SNNP region is being managed by different 
mechanisms of constitutional, institutional, and political practice. Yet, this has not 
been able to contain new questions of identity, not only seeking for recognition as 
a distinct ethnic group, but also a desire to establish ethnic territorial 
administrations. Moreover, ethnic groups that are already recognized are also 
laying claims to various self-determination rights, inter alia, to territorial 
autonomy, equitable participation, and the redrawing of internal (ethnic) 
boundaries. Based on legal analysis of cases from the SNNP region, the article 
critically discusses the quest for identity and self-determination, and provides an 
overview of the experience of the region. In dealing with the existing dilemma, we 
argue that there is a need to maintain the balance between constitutional rights to 
identity recognition and self-determination with the threat of ethnic and territorial 
fragmentations. 
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Introduction  
The Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP) region attests to the 
extremes of Ethiopia‟s ethnic federal experiment. On the one hand, the region, 
on the basis of a carefully crafted constitutional architecture and an overarching 
political practice, tries to accommodate its Nations, Nationalities and Peoples 
(NNP) by empowering them to preserve their identities and manage their own 
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affairs in defined territories. On the other hand, it stands at crossroads when it 
comes to adequately responding to the ever increasing questions, which inter 
alia include identity, equitable participation and self-rule claims by various 
ethnic groups. The latter claim, in particular, has unleashed what some, from the 
outset, had feared that ethnic federalism would trigger ethnic fragmentations and 
a never-ending request for ethnic territorial homelands.1  
In tandem with the overall logic of Ethiopia‟s version of federalism, the 
region has identified some 56 ethnic groups2 as its native (indigenous) identities 
capable of exercising the benefits accruing from the federal formula –be it in the 
form of territorial autonomy (TA), political participation, or cultural, linguistic, 
and economic self-determination (SD). Nonetheless, current developments show 
that the region has disappointed many when it comes to responding to the quest 
for identity and self-government rights.3 
At the moment, several communities are pushing for the recognition of their 
distinct identity in addition to the already existing 56 native identities, while the 
already recognized ethnic groups –dissatisfied with their status quo– are laying 
various claims to new zones and liyu weredas, territorial re-demarcations in 
order to be united with their ethnic kin across (territorial and political) borders, 
and equitable participation in the territories they already reside.  
A strong caveat to be noted is that most of the research in this article is based 
on developments before the political upheaval taking place since early 2018. 
While the SNNP region remained relatively calm during anti-government 
protests, it has however endured some of the worst inter communal violence 
after the coming to power of a new Prime Minister. Some of the instances 
                                           
Frequently used acronyms: 
CCI Council of Constitutional Inquiry 
CoN   Council of Nationalities 
HoF House of Federation 
SD Self determination 
SNNP Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples 
1
 Minase Haile (1996). “The New Ethiopian Constitution: Its Impact upon Unity, Human 
Rights and Development” Suffolk Transnational Law Review, Vol. 20, No.1. , pp. 20-21. 
2
 For the list of the 56 ethnic groups, see the document released by the Southern Nations 
Nationalities and Peoples Regional State Council of Nationalities, Communication, 
Minutes and Documentation Supporting Core Process Unit, (November 2011), document 
on file. This document additionally identifies, which of these ethnic groups are considered 
native to which of the zones and special woredas (district) – impliedly designating their 
ethnic territorial homelands. Yet, in order to fully understand the overall status of each of 
these ethnic groups at the regional and sub-regional administrations, one has to carefully 
study the political practice, which has far reaching implications, at times, over and above 
the constitutional design.  
3
 See the discussions below under sections 2 and 3. 
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include the regional capital Hawassa and surrounding areas in Sidama zone that 
saw the worst violence against non-indigenes. Protests in the towns of Wolaita 
Soddo and Wolkite, where property was ransacked and lives were lost and 
hundreds of thousands of ethnic Gedeo displaced by ethnic violence from the 
region of Oromia.   
Although the government has, in principle, agreed to answer the unfolding 
claims, the region currently, facing a serious threat of disintegration, remains 
under a military lockdown. While there are strong indications that the 
developing situations exemplify strong tendencies of ethnic and territorial 
fragmentations, this article neither provides a summary of these events nor does 
it base itself on these still ongoing issues, as this is not the place to do so.  
The following section, i.e., Section 1 forwards a conceptual framework for 
understanding the nature and types of ethnic and territorial claims under ethnic 
federalism. In the second section, the region‟s historical as well as political 
antecedents leading to distinct identity and SD claims are examined. Afterwards, 
the constitutional and legal frameworks that are used as springboards to decide 
on identity and SD claims are investigated by examining the various petitions. In 
the third and fourth sections, discussion is made on whether the existing legal 
framework is adequate in responding to the various demands or not, and in view 
of that, the article examines the sufficiency of the responses given so far and 
what can be done to balance identity and SD claims with the threats of ethnic 
and territorial fragmentations. 
1. Ethnic and Territorial Claims under Ethnic Federalism  
In simple terms, ethnic federalism is a type of federalism, which makes the 
constituent units of a federation, or at least some of them, homelands controlled 
by designated ethnic communities.4 To be exact, under ethnic federalism 
regional borders are intentionally drawn in favor of an ethnic group in order for 
the group to become a numerical and political majority. As such, Ethiopia‟s 
unique and enigmatic constitutional experiment in ethnic federalism –by 
allocating ethnic homelands to select ethnic groups and bolstered by the right to 
self-determination up to and including secession– has had a significant impact 
on the territorial and ethnic reorganization of the state since 1991.  
By making ethnic groups the subject of all the rights and privileges, ethnic 
federalism in Ethiopia has elevated ethnic communities to the position of 
                                           
4
 Philip G. Roeder (2010). „Ethno federalism and the Mismanagement of Conflicting 
Nationalisms‟, in Jan Erk and Lawrence M. Anderson (eds.), The Paradox of Federalism: 
Does Self-Rule Accommodate or Exacerbate Ethnic Divisions? Routledge, p. 14. 
66                               MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 13, No.1                             September 2019 
 
 
„makers and breakers‟ of the arrangement itself.5 The argument that ethnic 
federalism –in a bid to receive the greater share of benefit6– encourages 
divisions between and among ethnic communities has long been confirmed.7 
Inevitably, federalism exclusively founded upon ethnicity encourages ethnic 
communities to seek for greater autonomy including secession.8  
Obviously, under a political and constitutional configuration in which ethnic 
groups are accorded a special status and the benefits that go with it, claims based 
on ethnic identity will not only proliferate, but will also be contested by those 
who correspondingly stand to lose from it. As rightly noted by Roeder:  
“ethno federal and autonomy arrangements in ethnically divided societies 
structure politics inside ethnic communities, among ethnic communities and 
between those ethnic communities and the central government in ways that 
bring political instability. These institutions privilege some identities and 
interests and distribute coercive and defensive capabilities in a way that 
increases the likelihood of escalation of conflict into acute nation-state crises. 
Thus, these institutional arrangements are more likely than simple federal or 
unitary institutions to empower ethnic entrepreneurs who threaten the peace, 
the survival of democracy and the unity of the state. Particularly after civil 
wars, ethno federalism and autonomy arrangements represent imprudent 
institutional choices.”9 
The Ethiopian dispensation, not only has empowered (selected) ethnic 
communities in ethnically defined territories, but has also permitted (the 
remaining) ethnic groups to seek and determine their own ethnic territorial 
spaces.10 Paradoxically, the government, contrary to constitutional stipulations, 
has maintained a tight grip on those demanding their own territories –apparently, 
giving with one hand and taking it away with the other.11 Probabaly, in offering 
constitutional authorization to territorial claims, the setup, has not anticipated the 
possible formation of new ethnic groups seeking recognition or break up of 
existing ethnic communities, which eventually demand new ethnic territorial 
                                           
5
 Yonatan Tesfaye Fessha (2017). “The Original Sin of Ethiopian Federalism”, 
Ethnopolitics, Vol.16, No.3, pp. 232-245.  
6
 Solomon Negussie (2008). Fiscal Federalism in the Ethiopian Ethnic-based Federal 
System, Forum of Federations, p. 261. 
7
 Philip G. Roeder (2009). “Ethnofederalism and the Mismanagement of Conflicting 
Nationalisms” Regional & Federal Studies, Vol. 19, No.2, pp. 204-206.   
8
 Ted Robert Gurr (2000). Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century. 
Washington. DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, p. 195. 
9
 Roeder (2009), supra note 7, p. 206.  
10
 See, the FDRE Constitution, Arts 39 and 47. 
11
 Lovise Aalen (2011). The Politics of Ethnicity in Ethiopia: Actors, Power and 
Mobilization under Ethnic Federalism, Brill: Martinus Nijhof, p. 106. 
 The Quest for Identity and Self-Determination in the SNNP Region of Ethiopia                                 67 
 
 
homelands. However, the question of claiming ethnic difference and hence a re-
negotiation of a new identity became so common that it is threatening the legal 
and political order of the federation.  
But it cannot also be claimed that all this was unprecedented. The FDRE 
Constitution (which is authored by the NNPs) creates a „legal fiction‟ –that the 
country is the sum of its constituent ethnic groups, all sovereign power resides in 
them, they are entitled to own ethnically defined regions and sub-regional 
administrations, and, according to the second sentence in Article 40(3) of the 
Constitution, land is “the common property of the Nations, Nationalities and 
Peoples of Ethiopia.”  The tendency to create, harden and institutionalize 
difference along ethnic contours12 was thus clearly visible from the outset. 
Moreover, the acknowledgment of ethnicity as the sole organizing identity, 
made recognition as a distinct ethnic group, the only way to be part of the 
federal dispensation and access the benefits accruing from it.13  
Ethnic federalism in Ethiopia was made a first choice to respond to the long 
overdue demands of ethnic groups for equality of treatment, political and 
territorial autonomy as well as redressing of past injustices.14 And yet, after more 
than two decades of experimentation, it has exacerbated the very problems it was 
supposed to eradicate by localizing ethnic conflicts.15 By territorializing 
ethnicities into regional and sub-regional boundaries, it also gave rise to new 
minorities that, by and large, have been treated unfairly by regional and sub-
regional majorities. These minorities had no option but to intensify their claims 
for SD – seeking new territorial homelands – believing territorial autonomy is 
the only way to reverse their current status of marginalization.16 This has 
resulted, as further explained in the next section, in vicious cycles of identity and 
SD claims, which the territorialization of ethnicities does not seem to have an 
answer for.  
                                           
12
 Jan Erk and Lawrence Anderson (2010). „The Paradox of Federalism: Does Self-Rule 
Accommodate or Exacerbate Ethnic Divisions?‟ in Jan Erk and Lawrence M. Anderson, 
The Paradox of Federalism: Does Self-Rule Accommodate or Exacerbate Ethnic 
Divisions? Routledge, p. 2. 
13
 Yonatan, The Original Sin, supra note 7,  p. 232. 
14
 See generally, See Andreas Eshete (2013) “Ethnic Federalism: New Frontiers in Ethiopian 
Politics” in First National Conference on Federalism, Conflict and Peace Building, Addis 
Ababa: United Printers, pp. 142- 172.  
15
 Asnake Kefale, (2009). Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia: A Comparative study 
of the Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz Regions, (PHD Thesis, University of Leiden) p. 6.  
16
 See the discussion in Sections 2 ff.  
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2. Historical and Political Context vis-à-vis Identity and Self-
Determination Claims 
During the transitional period (1991-1994), the region that is currently 
designated as SNNP existed as five separate regions –named as Regions (Kilils) 
Seven, Eight, Nine, Ten and Eleven.17 At the time, Proclamation No 7/1992 
recognized 45 ethnic groups as the native identities of these regions. However, 
since then, and after the merger of the five regions into one, the number of the 
officially recognized native identities has increased to 56. Ethnically defined 
groups within the new dispensation had to therefore be accommodated through 
sub-regional administrations known as zones and liyu weredas. Of course, the 
regional constitution, in an institutionalization to an integrationist approach, 
obliged the Council of Nationalities (CoN) to promote and consolidate the unity 
of the region.18 
Because the region is further divided into ethnic based zones and liyu 
woredas, the sub regional structures exhibit a number of variations when it 
comes to identity and SD claims. Some zones like South Omo and Segene are 
institutionally setup as multiethnic, and hence they are entangled with 
competitive demands of both identity and SD between and among the several 
indigenous groups. However, Gurage Zone embraces other indigenous 
minorities although the name indicates a particular ethnic group, and this has 
brought the desire to further establish distinct ethnically defined zones and liyu 
woredas by these indigenous minorities. The zone also is rattled with claims of 
new identity questions as groups continue to lay claims in order to breakaway 
from Gurage –their supposed parent ethnic group.19 On top of this, in the context 
of internal border disputes, as is the case between Wolayita and Sidama, the 
region harbors one of the most critical territorial disputes in the country. 
Politically speaking, during the early days of federalism, EPRDF has focused 
on administrative integration, especially in the SNNP region, despite its 
commitment and permission to ethnic groups to organize and mobilize 
independently.20 However, the region that is currently organized under 20 
ethnically defined local governments is clearly struggling with accommodating 
56 ethnic groups. It was due to this struggle that the number and identity of the 
local government structures been a subject of various reformulations. In what 
became a stern test to the region‟s identity claims, Silte ethnic group broke away 
                                           
17
 See, Proc. 7/1992, Art. 3(1). 
18
 See, the SNNP Constitution, Art. 59(4).  
19
 For a discussion into the Silte case, see Lara Smith (2007). “Voting for an Ethnic Identity: 
Procedural and Institutional Responses to Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia”, Journal of Modern 
African Studies, Vol.45 No. 4, pp. 565-594.  
20
 Aalen, supra note 11, pp. 98-99. 
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from the Gurage and not only established itself as distinct, but also acquired a 
local government structure of its own –the Silte zone. Moreover, recognized 
ethnic groups have also continued to lay claim to various ethnic rights. For 
instance, during the initial days, North Omo zone was partitioned between 
Wolayita, Dawro, Gamo, Gofa and Basketo. In the year 2011, the liyu woredas 
of Konso, Burji, Derashe and Amaro were merged together as Segene, while by 
the year 2018 Gamo-Gofa zone was broken into Gamo and Gofa. Alaba was 
„elevated‟ to a zone from a liyu wereda and Konso managed to break away from 
the Segene zone to become a zone in its own. As the recent decision of the 
regional council indicates, these measures were supposedly undertaken to 
respond to the growing ethnic based demands within the region.21  
At the moment, the region is exhibiting a strong tendency to disintegrate. A 
handful of ethnic groups have already submitted their desire to form independent 
regions,22 while others are pushing for sub-regional administrations of their 
own.23 Many are carefully watching the claim by the Sidama for a regional status 
and its outcome, as it will surely decide the future fate of the region. 
3. Identity and Self-determination Claims 
Ethnic identity and, importantly, the ensuing SD rights, which follow from 
recognizing one as a distinct ethnic group, arguably, are the two pillars of 
Ethiopia‟s experiment on ethnic federalism. In particular, these two elements 
have far reaching implications in the SNNP region where many groups feel that 
their identity and SD rights have been tampered with.24 Legally speaking, the 
federal constitution, SNNP region‟s revised constitution and subordinate federal 
as well as SNNP region‟s legislations (proclamations) provide for the 
constitutional and legal frameworks on how issues of separate identity and SD 
are managed. A closer look at these laws reveals that they stipulate for 
procedural as well as substantive requirements, claimants (claiming either for 
distinct identity recognition, SD, or both) are supposed to comply with. The 
following two sub-sections discuss these matters in some detail. 
                                           
21
 See, የደቡብ ብ/ብ/ሕ/ክልል ምክር ቤት 5ኛ ዙር 4ኛ ዓመት የሥራ ዘመን 8ኛ መደበኛ ጉባዔ ቃለ ጉባዔ 
document on file. 
22
 Sidama, Kefa, Wolayita, Hadiaya and Gurage are among the NNPs who have pressed their 
demand openly for independent regional states, although the Sidama has gone additional 
steps, ahead of the others. The Sidama nation referred their claim to the SNNP regional 
state council, and the state council accepting their plea has referred the matter to the 
National Electoral Board for the later to organize a referendum on the new region 
formation request.  
23
 Developments in Gurage and Bench-Maji zones attest to this fact. 
24
 See the discussions below. 
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3.1 Distinct identity recognition claims  
Unlike issues relating to SD,25 where extensive provisions appear both in the 
federal as well as regional constitutions and subordinate legislations, the major 
challenge in resolving identity questions was the absence of a clear-cut law, 
which explicitly addressed a group‟s claim to be recognized as a distinct NNP.26 
In view of such fact, one has to trace the framework for analysis primarily from 
the House of Federation‟s (HoF)27 decision on the Silte case.  
In responding to the Silte identity question – the first of its kind in distinct 
identity recognition claims – the HoF (together with the advisory opinion from 
the Council of Constitutional Inquiry (CCI)28) substantively relied on Article 
39(5) of the federal Constitution. It argued that communities who claim distinct 
identity recognition are required to show that they have their own language, 
culture, belief in a common or related identity (self-identification), psychological 
makeup, and territorial contiguity. Concerning these requirements, the Council 
of Nationalities (CoN) –mandated with the power of settling identity 
determination issues at the regional level– in one of its decisions regarding 
identity determination underscored that a claimant community does not need to 
fulfill all the five criteria cumulatively.29 However, the CoN has since changed 
this position and the current understanding is that these are cumulative standards 
necessary for analyzing and deciding on identity determination claims.30  
An examination of the identity determination petitions from the three zones 
of Gamo-Gofa, South Omo and Gurage reveal that, although all claim to have 
fulfilled the foregoing requirements, they tend to emphasize on one of the 
elements to justify their distinctness. For instance, the Welene community, 
which is fiercely struggling to separate itself from the Gurage identity in the 
Gurage zone,31 claims that they are wrongly characterized as Gurage.32 Welenes 
                                           
25
 See the discussion below under section 3.2. 
26
 See the House of the Federation of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
“Advisory opinion of the CCI on the Silte case” (2008). Journal of Constitutional 
Decisions, Vol. 1, pp. 42-43. 
27
 The HoF is the second house of parliament, composed of the recognized NNPs, entrusted 
with various unique powers, among which, the power to interpret the constitution stands 
out as the prominent one. See the FDRE Constitution, Art. 62(1). 
28
 The CCI is an advisory body advising the HoF on issue of constitutional interpretation. 
See, the FDRE Constitution, Art. 84. 
29
 This was the position of the CoN in deliberating on the Manja identity recognition 
petition. Christophe Van der Beken (2012). Unity in Diversity-Federalism as a Mechanism 
to Accommodate Ethnic Diversity: The Case of Ethiopia, Lit Verlag, p. 274. 
30
 Interview with Speaker of the House of the Council of Nationalities, SNNP Regional State 
(Hawassa, 12 July 2017). 
31
 Application by Welene community to the CoN, (10/11/2005 E.C), (Tir 02, 2007 E.C), 
(Hidar 11, 2005 E.C), (Meskerem 9, 2003), on file with the registrar of the CoN, Hawassa; 
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argue that they possess the distinct identity markers provided in both the federal 
and SNNP constitution.33 However, as their several petitions illustrate, Welenes 
strongly argue for a separate identity singularly on the basis of their distinct 
language from the Gurage. 
In Gamo Gofa zone,34 Dorze35 and Qucha36 are petitioning to negotiate their 
distinctness from Gamo ethnic group, while Mello37 and Uba Gezo38 wish to 
separate from Gofa ethnic group. What differentiate distinct identity 
determination issues of the zone from that of the Welene is the mutual 
intelligibility of languages between petitioner communities and their respective 
parent ethnic groups from which separation is sought.  
Another identity determination from this zone relates to the Seyk Ari (which 
border the Ari of the South-Omo).39 They are disenfranchised due to their 
demarcation into Gamo-Gofa zone, which broke them apart from their ethnic kin 
Aris in South-Omo, and they have thus instituted an identity recognition claim.40 
A closer examination of the Seik Ari petition, however, demonstrates that their 
demand, rather than being recognized as a distinct ethnic group, is more of 
requesting participatory rights within the Gamo-Gofa zone or re-demarcation 
                                                                                                            
Application by the Welene Peoples Democratic Party to the CoN, (Tahsas 4, 2008), on file 
with the registrar of the CoN, Hawassa. 
32
 Application submitted by Welene people to the CoN, (10/11/2005 E.C), on file with the 
registrar of the CoN, Hawassa; see also the application by the Wolene Language speakers‟ 
people democratic Moment (currently named, the Welene People Democratic Party 
(WPDT), letter written to the CoN on 26/02/2001 E.C., document on the file with the 
registrar of the CoN, Hawassa. 
33
 Application submitted by Welene people to the CoN, Ibid. 
34
 This zone is one among those institutionally established as multiethnic. Gamo, Gofa, 
Oyida, Zayisse, and Gidecho ethnic groups are identified as the native identities of the 
zone. 
35
 Application of the Dorze to the CoN, (Hidar 11, 2004 E.C), on file with the registrar of the 
CoN, Hawassa. 
36 
Application of the Qucha to the CoN, (Nehase 29, 2005 E.C) on file with the registrar of 
the CoN, Hawassa. 
37
 Minutes of the Mello-Koza woreda, 3rd round second regular meeting, (22/6/98 E.C), on 
file with the registrar of the CoN, Hawassa. Interestingly, the Mello-Koza woreda council 
has renounced the demand of the Gofa for a zonal status. The motive behind it seems very 
clear. If Gofas are allowed a zonal status, Mellos will be subjected to additional 
discrimination and marginalization than what is already in existence. 
38 
Uba Gezo petition to the CoN (20/04/2005 E.C), on file with the registrar of the CoN, 
Hawassa. 
39
 Application of the Seyik Ari to the CoN, (21/05/2001 E.C), (24/09/2001 E.C), (8/01/05 
E.C), (4/02/2005 E.C), (22/10/2005 E.C), on file with the registrar of the CoN, Hawassa. 
40
 Ibid.  
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into their ethnic kin found in South Omo zone. Probably, the request for distinct 
recognition is triggered by the lack of participatory rights within the zone. 
In the South Omo zone, the Goza Zift community41 in petitioning for identity 
determination, argued how its language differs from the remaining ethnic groups 
by citing selected vocabularies, their equivalents in Amharic (the working 
language of the federal as well as the SNNP regional governments) and their 
variations with other NNPs languages42 and indicated how their culture is 
unrelated to the remaining NNPs by referring to their customary marriage 
celebration, funeral ceremonies, and historical legacies.43 Yet, the major point 
for them in seeking identity determination seems to relate to ensuring their 
survival and the creation of a conducive environment to develop their language, 
culture and preserve their history, which are all on the verge of extinction. All 
these claims have not been given formal response by the regional apparatus. 
With regard to the question as to who has the authority to decide on identity 
questions, the opinion by the majority members of the Council of Constitutional 
Inquiry (CCI) –which was later on fully endorsed by the HoF– 44 stated that 
Articles 52(2)(a) and 62(3) of the FDRE Constitution do not clearly mention the 
entity that has the power to answer identity questions. Based on this premise, the 
CCI stated that such matters shall be interpreted as falling under the (residual) 
powers of the regions.45  
In justifying the argument, the CCI stated that regions have to first answer the 
question of identity in order to establish the necessary institutions for self-rule –
impliedly making identity questions within their jurisdiction. Secondly, as 
questions of identity are initially raised in the regions, responding to identity 
claims is the power of the regional councils because the regions have exclusive 
jurisdiction on regional matters in accordance with the FDRE Constitution).46 
                                           
41
 Application submitted by Goza Zift community to the CoN, (24/12/2002 E.C), on file with 
the registrar of the CoN, Hawassa. 
42 
Ibid. 
43 
Ibid. 
44
 Decision of the House of the Federation Regarding Resolution of Claim For Identity, 
(April 2001), document on file.  
45
 CCI advisory opinion, supra note 26, p. 44. 
46
 It seems, the reference to the regional councils was because, at the time, the power to 
interpret regional constitutions was vested with the respective regional councils. It was 
only after the regions revised their constitutions in and after 2001 that they conferred the 
power to interpret the regional constitutions on a separate regional organ – the 
Constitutional Interpretation Commission (CIC)). The SNNP region, however, entrusted 
the same task to the CoN – an institution similar to that of the HoF. 
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Yet, a party aggrieved by the decisions of regional councils has the right to 
appeal to the HoF.47 
The CCI cautiously elaborated on the power of the regional councils by 
stating that despite the role played by the councils, the ultimate decision maker 
in identity questions is the concerned community itself.48 The primary role of the 
regional councils is to check whether the requirements set under Article 39(5) 
have been (procedurally) complied with. If the claimant community or group 
proves that there is a sufficient case, the regional council causes a referendum to 
be organized and the concerned community decides on the final fate of the 
identity question via direct participation.49  
Regarding procedural matters (like who shall be a claimant in identity 
recognition claims), the HoF stated that there is no restriction by the Constitution 
as to who has standing. Yet, claimants are still required to submit their questions 
in writing by showing that the requirements specified under Article 39(5) of the 
Constitution are satisfied. The concerned regional council can afterwards make 
further inquiries on whether the elements Article 39(5) have been fulfilled or 
not. The HoF decision highlighted that the question of identity shall be ripe for a 
referendum within a maximum period of one year from the date of submission of 
the claim to the concerned regional council.50  
                                           
47 
The power of the HoF to decide on such matters emanates from art 62(3) of the FDRE 
Constitution. See also CCI advisory opinion, supra note 26, p. 44; As the HoF decision 
stated: a claim raised by a community regarding its identity shall be first presented to and 
treated by the council of the regional state in which the community is found. It should only 
be referred to the HoF if the claimant community complains that its question has not been 
treated by the regional council properly or in accordance with the constitution and there 
arises, as a result, a misunderstanding between the regional council and the community. In 
this case, the decision by the House of the Federation shall be final. HoF decision on the 
Silte case, supra note 44, p. 4. 
48 
HoF decision on the Silte case, supra note 44,  p. 4. 
49 
CCI advisory opinion, supra note 45, p. 45; the opinion of the minority members of the 
CCI held that a referendum is not always a necessity and the regional council can decide 
on the ultimate fate of an identity question short of holding a referendum through other 
democratic mechanisms provided in the constitution. In fact, at one point, they clearly 
argued that it is only for cases of secession and formation of new regions that the 
constitution stipulates for holding of a referendum. However, they failed to clearly 
indicate which of these mechanisms are available in the constitution and how they can be 
utilized. CCI advisory opinion, supra note 44, pp. 47-48. 
50
 HoF decision on the Silte case, supra note 45, p. 5; initially the constitutional and regional 
affairs standing committee suggested a maximum of six months. The House of the 
Federation of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (2008) “Advisory opinion of 
the constitutional and regional affairs standing committee”, Journal of Constitutional 
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The HoF decision also indicated that a detailed law on these procedural 
matters, whenever necessary, might be promulgated at the federal and regional 
levels.51 It seems that Proclamation No. 251/2001 (Consolidation of the House 
of Federation and the Definition of its Powers and Responsibilities 
Proclamation), and Proclamation No. 60/2003 (a regional Proclamation of the 
SNNP region, i.e., –the Consolidation of House of Council of Nationalities and 
Definition of its Powers and Responsibilities) were promulgated to address 
issues of procedure. 
In particular, Proclamation No. 251/2001, concerning identity questions 
states: after exhaustion of all state (regional) level remedies,52 “any Nation, 
Nationality, or People who believes that its self-identities are denied, its right of 
self-administration is infringed, promotion of its culture, language and history 
are not respected, in general its rights enshrined in the constitution are not 
respected or, violated for any reason, may present its application to the [HoF]”.53  
The same proclamation changed the one year period that was stated by the 
HoF in the Silte decision, stipulating that the region concerned shall reach a 
decision within two years from the time it received an application for identity 
determination.54 The concerned party can then, depending upon the 
circumstances, directly appeal to the HoF, if the application has not been 
decided within two years or if it is not satisfied with the decision.55 The HoF, 
upon receiving the appeal, shall reach a decision over the case in not more than 
two years.56 Accordingly, an identity question, which starts at the regional level 
and goes all the way to the HoF, is expected to be settled within a maximum of 
four years. In reality, however, the Welene application is, for example, pending 
                                                                                                            
Decisions, Vol. 1, pp. 50-52. But see the discussion below in which Proc. 251/2001 
extended this period to two years. 
51
 HoF decision on the Silte case, supra note 44, p. 5. 
52
 Proc. 251/2001, Art. 20(1). 
53
 Id., Art. 19(1); See also, Proc. 60/2003, art 21(3), which provides for an identical 
statement. In here, one notices the confusion that arises as a result of the use by the 
particular provisions of the term NNPs for those groups still seeking to be recognized as 
an NNP. The same issue was a subject of heated debate in the HoF before the House 
reached a decision in the Silte case. See, The House of the Federation of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia “Decision of the HoF in the Silte case” (2008) Journal of 
Constitutional Decisions, pp. 57-60. One can speculate in here: since it is the particular 
claimant/s, which ultimately decides on whether it is an NNP or not, the drafters of the law 
chose to use the wording NNP rather than community or group.  
54
 Proc. 251/2001, Art 20(2). 
55
 Id., Art. 20(3). 
56 
Id., Art. 22. 
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before the CoN and HoF (on appeal)57 for decades. The time limit does not thus 
seem to create any accountability on the institutions reviewing identity 
determination cases.58 
Regarding the form of the application, first, it has to be presented in writing. 
Second, the application must include the details of the question supported with 
names, addresses and signatures of at least five per cent of the inhabitants of the 
claimant group and whenever necessary, it should bear the official seal and 
signature of the administration that presented the question.59 If the application is 
being submitted through a delegated individual or individuals, they shall produce 
reliable evidence of their delegation.60  
Ambiguities still persist on the type of evidence that should be submitted to 
substantiate that the delegates are genuine representatives of the community 
concerned. Other ambiguities evoke questions such as: what does the five 
percent threshold refer to? Does it refer to the whole claimant community or 
only those who support the claim? How is their signature verified for 
authenticity? These gaps can be exploited, both by government authorities and 
ethnic entrepreneurs.  
3.2 Self-determination claims   
Three aspects of SD are discussed in the following paragraphs. Establishing 
ethnic territorial homelands below the regional level as a means of advancing 
self-rule (3.2.1), territorial re-demarcations so that an ethnic group (found on the 
„wrong side‟ of the territorial and political border) reunites with its ethnic 
homeland (kin) in order to best utilize the various aspects of SD (3.2.2), and the 
right of ethnic groups to have equitable and effective participation in various 
governance levels in the territories they occupy (3.2.3). The general framework 
for SD is found in the FDRE Constitution. In particular, Article 39 enumerates 
the various aspects of SD. For the most part, this provision is simulated under 
Article 39 of the SNNP Constitution. Of course, the SNNP Revised Constitution, 
while putting SD in a regional context, goes further and stipulates for ethnic 
based local governments. 
                                           
57
 Application of the Welene community to the HoF, (10/07/99), document on file with the 
registrar of the CoN, Hawassa. 
58
 Interview with the Speaker of the Council of Nationalities, supra note 30; Interview with 
Nationalities Rights Protection and Constitutional Awareness Creation Core Work Process 
Owner, (Hawassa, 1 July 2017). At the time of fieldwork, a task force was being setup by 
the CoN to formally study the petitions of the Wolanes. 
59
 Proc. 251/2001, Art. 21(1); Proc. 60/2003 under Art. 22(1) provides for a similar 
undertaking. 
60 
Proc. 251/2001, Art, 21(2). 
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3.2.1 Questions of administrative hierarchy 
The tremendous diversity in the SNNP region, to an arguable extent, is being 
managed, among others, by establishing an administrative hierarchy below the 
regional level –known as zones and liyu weredas– targeting the accommodation 
of the hitherto marginalized ethnic minorities.61 The pressing question here is: 
what are the standard criteria for an ethnic group to have a zone or liyu wereda? 
Who has the authority to decide on the establishment, breakup and merger of 
zones or liyu weredas? What are the procedural requirements that have to be 
followed to request a zone or liyu wereda? 
The frequently cited provisions understood to provide a not so clear 
constitutional base for local governments in Ethiopia are Articles 39(3) and 
50(4) of the federal Constitution.62 Following this and in its fitting use of its 
subnational constitutional space, the SNNP region has established ethnic based 
local governments63 functioning just below the regional hierarchy. According to 
the FDRE Constitution, each NNP of the region is granted the right to 
“administer its affairs within its own defined territory”64 as well as 
“establish[ing] its own governmental organizations pertinent to its geographical 
settlement”.65 From this, it seems, the sole requirement for one to have a zone or 
liyu wereda is to be a recognized NNP within the region.66 Thus, all the 56 
native identities, in theory, have the right to establish ethnic-based local 
governments provided they comply with the procedural requirements for seeking 
an administrative hierarchy.67  
                                           
61
 Even though there are additional administrative hierarchies below the regional level, it is 
only the zones and liyu woredas that are established with the purpose of ethnic minority 
accommodation. A look at the provisions of Arts 80-87 of the SNNP Constitution reveals 
that a zone and a liyu woreda have the same institutional hierarchies. Nevertheless, in 
practice, it seems, a zone is allocated to ethnic groups with large population size while liyu 
woredas for those with small population size. 
62
As argued by many, the exact place of local governments in the Ethiopian discourse is not 
clear and straightforward. See for instance, Getachew Assefa (2015). “The Legal 
Framework of Local Governments in Ethiopia: Some Issues” in Asnake Kefale and Assefa 
Fiseha (eds) Federalism and Local Government in Ethiopia, Center for Federal Studies: 
Addis Ababa University, pp.188-189, Zemelak Ayele (2015). “Local Government and its 
Institutional Security Within Ethiopia‟s Federal System” in Asnake Kefale and Assefa 
Fiseha (eds) Federalism and Local Government in Ethiopia, Center for Federal Studies: 
Addis Ababa University, p. 205. 
63 
See the SNNP Constitution, Art 39. 
64 
Id., Art. 39(2). 
65 
Id., Art. 39(3). 
66 
As will be discussed under sections three and four, the practice seems to deviate from this, 
and focuses exclusively on administrative efficiency in granting an administrative 
hierarchy. 
67
 See for instance Art 45(2) of the SNNP Constitution. 
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From the cumulative reading of the provisions of Proclamation No. 251/2001 
and Proclamation No. 60/2003, the form of presenting the application regarding 
question of administrative hierarchy is similar to that of question of identity: i.e., 
it should be made in writing, approved by at least five percent of the claimants 
through their signatures, and it should bear an official seal and signature of the 
authority presenting the question as the case may be.68 Obviously, in the case of 
the former, the claimants are either the NNPs themselves or the concerned 
administrative authority representing the particular NNP.69 The same time limit 
of two years at both the regional and federal levels applies to questions of 
administrative hierarchy as well.  
The various provisions of the regional constitution pertaining to the powers 
of the Council of Nationalities (CoN)70 and the state council show who has the 
power to decide on the establishment, breakup and merger of the zones and liyu 
weredas. The SNNP Constitution stipulates that the administrative hierarchies 
below the regional level are the zones or liyu weredas, weredas, and Kebeles 
(the lowest administrative unit below the district).71 Establishing additional 
administrative hierarchies by taking into account the size of the population and 
socio-economic activities within the region is the power of the state council.72 
The CoN is empowered to decide on issues relating to NNPs right to zone or liyu 
wereda administration.73 The CoN is also entrusted with the task of finding 
solutions to disputes that may arise between administrative hierarchies.74 
It is discernible from the foregoing that, even though both have, what seems 
to be, an overlapping power regarding the zones or liyu weredas, their particular 
competencies depend on the questions raised –particularly, on who wants to do 
what regarding the zones or liyu weredas. A request to establish, merge or 
partition an administrative hierarchy for the reason of population size or for 
socio-economic reasons will be handled by the state council; and if the 
establishment, breakup or merger of the administrative hierarchy is in one way 
or the other related with the ethnic rights of the NNPs, it will be the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the CoN. 
                                           
68 
Proc. 251/2001, Art 21 cumulative Proc. 60/2003, Art 22. 
69 
See Proc. 60/2003, Art 21(1) and (2) respectively.  
70
 The CoN is the second house of parliament of the SNNP region, composed of the 56 
NNPs, which among others is entrusted with the power to interpret the regional 
constitution. (See, Art. 59(1) of the SNNP Constitution.) 
71
 See, the SNNP Constitution, Art 45(1). By the same provision, the state council is 
empowered to “organize other administrative hierarchies and determine their powers and 
duties”. 
72
 See, the SNNP Constitution, Art. 51(3) (b). 
73
 Id., Art. 59(3). 
74 
Id., Art. 59(5). 
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The overlapping nature of the powers of the two institutions is demonstrated 
by the following two cases. For instance, the two dominant groups of Gamo and 
Gofa, in Gamo-Gofa zone have for long petitioned to the CoN for the 
dismantling of the union and the formation of an ethnic administration of their 
own. While Gamo75 feel that a separate administration of their own is justified 
based on their very large population size, Gofa76 in contrast claim that they have 
been politically dominated and marginalized by Gamos. Despite the long 
overdue claim, the state council was the one, which recently decided in favor of 
breaking up the zone and establish a Gamo zone and Gofa zone for each ethnic 
group, on what, apparently, looked like an ethnic based demand.  
On another instance, it was the state council, which decided on the merger of 
the four liyu weredas to establish the Segene zone, whereas the quest of the 
Konso to breakaway from the same zone and establish a distinct ethnic territorial 
administration of its own was first handled by the CoN and later by the state 
council.  The creation of the Segene zone was accomplished through the merger 
of the four liyu weredas (of Konso, Derashe,77 Amaro (kore), and Burji) and one 
regular wereda of Alle. Eight ethnic groups78 are considered as the founding 
members of the zone. The way in which these administrative hierarchies were 
amalgamated and the impact they had on the self-rule rights of the constituent 
ethnic groups raised eyebrows –in particular on those who used to have their 
own distinct ethnic territorial administrations. Among those whose liyu wereda 
status was revoked, the Konso case evoked much anger and the ensuing standoff 
led to the loss of many lives and destruction of property.79   
While the regional government insisted that the decision for the consolidation 
was taken to curb the constant conflicts that arise between the different ethnic 
groups of the area,80 some contend that the move was a hasty solution to the 
                                           
75
 The petition by the Gofa to the CoN, (24/8/98 E.C), on file with the registrar of the CoN, 
Hawassa; Gofas started to petition for a separate zonal status as early as 1987 E.C. 
76
 The Gamo application to the State Council of the SNNP, (Hamle 10 1997 E.C), on file 
with the registrar of the CoN, Hawassa. 
77
 Derashe woreda is understood to institutionally belong to the Derashe, Kusume, Mosiye, 
and Mashole ethnic groups. 
78
 The eight ethnic groups considered the founding members and hence indigenous to the 
zone are Kore, Mashole, Mosiye, Derashe, Alle, Kusume, Burji, and Konso. 
79
 See “Ethiopia's Clampdown on Dissent Tests Ethnic Federal Structure” (2016). The 
Guardian <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/apr/08/ethiopia-
clampdown-dissent-ethnic-federal-structure> (last accessed 19 April 2016). 
80
 Decision of the CoN on a request by Konso for a zonal status, Sene 20, 2008, Hawassa, p. 
5, document on file; See also the Decision of the state council to establish the Segene Area 
People, Yekatit 16 2003, p. 2, document on file.  
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recurring quest of the Alle for self-administration and autonomy.81 Subsequently, 
the regional government assigned a regular wereda to Alle from territories 
(kebeles), which were previously administered by the Derashe and Konso liyu 
weredas.82 Yet, Alle regular wereda had no linking administrative tier below the 
regional government; and as a regular wereda, it could not have a straight 
connection with the regional administration. The solution pursued by the 
regional government was to merge the four liyu weredas along with the regular 
wereda of Alle and form the Segene zone. 83 
The apparent quick fix triggered a wide scale protest by Konsos. Soon after 
the establishment of the Segene zone, Konsos started petitioning to establish 
their own zone. They claimed that the merger undermined, among others, their 
self-administration rights.84 After a protracted period of petitioning, which 
witnessed a massive scale uprising, violence and loss of life in the konso 
wereda,85 the CoN decision found Konsos as not having a sufficient case for a 
separate zone.86  
In justifying its decision, the CoN, among others, mentioned the breakdown 
of the constitutional and legal order in the area, and the societal backlash against 
those who did not support the petition to establish a zone for Konsos.87 The CoN 
decided to use these two post-petition scenarios to validate the denial of the 
zonal request. Even though these incidents are somehow related to the 
petitioning process (not to mention the fact that the decision of the CoN was 
unduly delayed), using the chaos that ensued afterwards to retrospectively 
rationalize the establishment of the Segene zone and deny the right of Konso to 
self-administration did not seem a step in the right direction. 
                                           
81
 See Applications of the Alle to the CoN (3/9/1997 E.C), (20/01/1998 E.C), (14/03/2002 
E.C), on file with the registrar of the CoN, Hawassa; See the Application by Alle (Debase 
Gewada) to HoF (23/10/98 E.C), on file with the registrar of the HoF, Addis Ababa. 
82
 Abate Seyoum (2017). “What was troubling Konso? How Konso people‟s demand for 
constitutional self-determination was met with state violence” Addis Standard 
<http://addisstandard.com/commentary-what-was-troubling-konso/> (last accessed on July 
28, 2017). 
83
 Ibid. 
84
 See the latest applications by Konso to the CoN, (Sene 13, 2008 E.C), (13/02/2007 E.C) 
on file with the registrar of the CoN, Hawassa; Application by Konso to the HoF, 
(20/01/2008 E.C), on file with the registrar of the HoF, Addis Ababa. 
85
 See for instance “The Konso Face Escalating Torture, Killings and Human Rights 
Violations Following their Constitution-based and Peaceful Request for Zone 
Administrative Structure”.  
   <http://konsopeople.com/protest-%E1%89%B5%E1%8C%8D%E1%88%8D/>  
   (Last accessed on 28 July 2017). 
86
 Decision of the CoN on Konso, supra note 80, pp. 1-9.  
87
 Id., pp. 3-5.  
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The CoN further argued that the amalgamation of the administrative 
hierarchies was undertaken to boost economic development and eradicate 
conflicts. The decision however fails to justify how the recentralization process 
can achieve this or why this cannot be accomplished if Konso remained as a liyu 
wereda or if they separate to establish their own zone. The CoN seems to believe 
that the merger has not affected the self-rule rights of ethnic groups in the zone, 
since those ethnic groups continue to exercise self-administration through their 
respective (regular) weredas.88 A simple look at the provisions of the SNNP 
Constitution on regular weredas and liyu wereda or zones clarifies their 
difference.89 While the latter is an administrative hierarchy having the purpose 
of ethnic minority accommodation, the former is simply a hierarchy set up for 
administrative decentralization without the purpose of catering to the needs of 
ethnic self-rule demands.90 
The CoN reasoned that a request for additional administrative hierarchies has 
to be seen in light of whether such requests benefit the people or not because an 
administrative hierarchy is not an end in itself.91 A question that arises in 
response to this argument is whether this was not clear from the outset in 
establishing the region and the ethnic federal structure in general. The decision 
of the CoN in this regard cannot be explained in light of Article 39 of the SNNP 
Constitution, which declares that all NNPs have the right to establish ethnic 
based local governments. Without having clear guidelines on how to establish, 
breakup or merge administrative hierarchies, the crude reasoning of 
administrative efficiency seems more of a double standard rather than a 
reasonable justification.  
In spite of the claim that the administrative integration has been beneficial to 
ethnic groups that are better off from their previous positions, ethnic 
antagonisms still continue to bedevil the sub-regional administration.92 After all 
                                           
88
 Decision of the CoN on Konso, supra note 80, p. 7; A similar understanding existed when 
the merger was decide by the State Council, Decision of the CoN on Konso, supra note 
80, p. 3. 
89 
Compare Arts 80-89 on zone or liyu woreda administrations to that of Arts 90-102 on 
woreda administrations of the SNNP Constitution. 
90 
Despite the constitution establishing woredas as mere administrative units of 
decentralization, there appears a confusion of considering these woredas as serving a 
similar purpose of ethnic minority accommodation. If any, the only time these woredas are 
constitutionally empowered to cater to ethnic identity issues is, as per article 58(3), where 
an ethnic groups does not have a liyu woreda or zone, the woreda council is used to elect a 
representative of that particular ethnic group to the CoN.   
91 
Decision of the CoN on Konso, supra note 80, p. 6. 
92
 For instance, see the application by the Kore (Amaro) minority found in Burji woreda to 
the CoN, (15/05/2006 E.C), on file with the registrar of the CoN, Hawassa, in which they 
allege that Kore ethnic minorities living in the Burji woreda are discriminated against and 
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this process, it was recently decided, apparently overturning the decision of the 
CoN, that Konso should be established as a separate zone.93 And surprisingly, 
the decision was made not by the CoN but by the state council. 
One can cautiously argue, since the question of merger (administrative 
integration) by the four liyu weredas was made on the basis of enhancing 
administrative efficiency, it was handled by the state council, as it was thought it 
had nothing to do with ethnic rights. However, the Konso question to establish 
its own zone, exclusively pleaded that the administrative integration has 
tampered with the right to self-rule of Konso; the decisions of the CoN and the 
state council, further blur the respective competencies between the CoN and the 
state council when it comes to an ethnic group‟s demand for self-rule and 
territorial autonomy (TA). 
Looking at the rules of decision-making, the state council supposedly decides 
on questions of administrative hierarchy (that are short of ethnic claims), on the 
basis of votes cast by members of the state council.94 However, the regional 
constitution does not provide for specific substantive rules which can be the 
basis for the council to reach at a decision. The CoN, on the other hand, is 
required to resolve issues of administrative hierarchy (centered on ethnic rights) 
based on “settlement pattern, languages, identities, and consent of the people 
concerned.”95 In spite of this, the issue of administrative hierarchy –depending 
up on how the question is raised– shall ultimately be decided by the NNP 
concerned through a majority vote96 or by the council (concerned) supported by 
two third of its members.97 The CoN, in settling this matter, shall only take a 
maximum of one and a half years.98  
                                                                                                            
in particular they have been denied of, among others, the right to have their children taught 
in their own mother tongue.  
93
 See, የደቡብ ብ/ብ/ሕ/ክልል ምክር ቤት 5ኛ ዙር 4ኛ ዓመት የሥራ ዘመን 8ኛ መደበኛ ጉባዔ ቃለ ጉባዔ፣ 
document on file. 
94
 Concerning decision making procedures at the state council level, see art 56(1) and (2) of 
the SNNP constitution.  
95
 Proc 60/2003, Art 21(2). 
96
 Id., Art. 23(1). 
97
 Id., Art. 23(2). 
98
 Id., Art. 23(3). 
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3.2.2  Boundary re-demarcations as a mechanism of responding to self-
determination claims  
Regardless of the various ways boundaries might be drawn, territorialization in a 
federal setup will always leave some ethnic groups “on the wrong side”.99 Even 
though the underlying purpose of creating ethnic homelands is to construct a 
political community within a particular territory whereby that community 
articulates its wishes through self-rule, while at the same time participating in 
the wider context through shared rule,100 no territorial unit can be hundred 
percent homogenous. Under such circumstances, the fear is, minorities turned 
majorities will use their new gained powers to oppress and discriminate against 
their own minorities.101  
The SNNP region is not an exception to this challenge. Various ethnic 
disputes have erupted revolving around border areas between ethnic groups.102 
As a solution to the problem, boundary demarcations and re-demarcations have 
occurred. In the context of the SNNP region, redrawing of boundaries mainly 
refers to: (i) redrawing the regional boundary with other neighboring regions, 
and (ii) redrawing (or request to re-draw) internal boundaries to resolve a dispute 
between ethnic groups in two sub-regional administrations (zones or liyu 
woredas). 
While it is the exclusive power of the HoF to resolve boundary disputes 
between two regions,103 it is the power of the CoN to settle boundary disputes 
between two sub-regional administrations.104 The CoN is required to settle such 
disputes in not more than one and a half years from the receipt of an 
application.105 It shall decide on these (internal) border disputes on the basis of 
the peoples‟ consent and settlement patterns.106 Accordingly, it can settle the 
matter either by out rightly passing a decision, if it thinks it has sufficient 
                                           
99
 Michael Keating (2004). “So Many Nations So Few States: Territory and Nationalism in 
the Global Era” in AG Gagnon and J Tully (eds) Multinational Democracies, Cambridge 
University Press, p. 45.  
100 
Annelies Verstichel (2009).  Participation, Representation and Identity: The Right of 
Persons Belonging to Minorities to Effective Participation in Public Affairs: Content, 
Justification and Limits, Intersentia, p. 469. 
101 Margaret Moore (2005). “Internal minorities and Indigenous Self-determination” in A 
Eisenberg and J Spinner-Halev (eds) Minorities within Minorities: Equality, Rights and 
Diversity, Cambridge University Press, p. 272. 
102
 The prominent one in this respect is the border dispute between Wolayita and Sidama 
zones in and around lake Abaya. See, Aalen, supra note 11, pp. 163-171. 
103
 See, the FDRE Constitution, Art. 62(6).  
104
 See, the SNNP Constitution, Art 59(5).  
105
 Proc. 60/2003, Art 36. 
106
 Id., Art. 32. 
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information on the matter107 or organizing a referendum, if it finds it difficult to 
assess the consent of the people.108  
An instance of the former case is the decision of the CoN in an internal 
border dispute in Lake Abaya area between Sidama and Wolayta zones.109 The 
Abaya area is a locality found between Humbo woreda of Wolayita zone and 
Dale woreda of Sidama zone. In eight of the Kebeles, Sidama submitted 
application for demarcation from Humbo woreda to Dale woreda of Sidama 
zone. The CoN gave a decision accepting the demands of the Sidama and 
decided that they should be re-demarcated into the Dale woreda 110 Wolayita 
lodged an appeal to the HoF against this decision.111 However, the HoF affirmed 
the decision of the CoN. Nevertheless, to date, no border demarcation has taken 
place based on the decision of the two institutions.112 
Wolayita thought that the decision went in favour of the Sidama because of 
the latter‟s political dominance within the region.113 In contrast, Sidama 
communities in the area thought the only way to secure their existence is 
demarcation to the Sidama Zone.114 After the recent conflict between Sidama 
and Wolayita, the Abaya dispute has resurfaced and each group is strengthening 
its claim over the disputed territory. 
3.2.3 Equitable and effective participation115 
In spite of the claim that ethnic groups are entitled to administer their own 
affairs in their own defined territories, the reality (in a region that hosts 56 ethnic 
groups) shows that only few ethnic groups have sub-regional administrations of 
their own. Furthermore, territorial administrations exhibit ethnic heterogeneity 
rather than homogeneity. As a result, those entitled to territorial autonomy 
became the titular groups that threaten the individual and group specific rights of 
                                           
107
 Id., Art. 33(1). 
108
 Id., Art. 33(2). 
109
 See the Decision of the CoN Regarding the Border Demarcation Dispute in Abaya area 
between the Humbo woreda of Wolayita Zone and Dale woreda of Sidama zone (Butajira 
14 Nehase 1997 E.C), document on file. 
110
 Ibid.   
111
 Application of Wolayitas in Humbo Woreda to the HoF, (Meskerem 12, 1998 E.C), copy 
on file with the registrar of the HoF, Addis Ababa. 
112
 Interview with Head of the Constitutional Matters Core Process, Council of Nationalities 
(Hawassa, 8 February 2016). 
113
 Aalen, supra note 11, p. 175. 
114
 Id., p. 173. 
115
 The discussion of equitable participation is only limited to administrative hierarches 
(zones or liyu woredas) that are created to accommodate ethnic minorities. 
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the non-titular ones.116 The puzzling question, therefore, is: how can the non-
titular groups be entitled to exercise their right of equitable and effective 
participation at the regional level and sub-regional territorial administrations? 117  
As some cases like the Qebenas118 in the Gurage zone demonstrate, a petition 
for a territorial administration is triggered by lack of effective and equitable 
participation. Qebenas justify their request for a liyu wereda primarily by 
asserting that they suffer from discrimination from the zone in the distribution of 
resources, lack of infrastructure, unemployment, absence of good governance.119 
They allege that a liyu wereda of their own will allow them to get fair 
representation in all levels of government structure since the zone has promoted 
the supremacy of the Gurage identity alone.120 
More recently, the lack of participation has also led to a boundary dispute 
between the Welkite city administration (the capital of Gurage zone) and Qebena 
wereda. Qebenas allege the city administrations territorial expansion is being 
undertaken at the expense of their self-rule rights.121 Obviously, an elevation of 
Qebenas to a liyu wereda will automatically put on hold any expansion to the 
territory they claim as theirs, since liyu weredas, unlike regular weredas, have 
their own defined territories in the interest of promoting the self-rule rights of a 
particular ethnic group.122 A similar claim by Kara found in Hamer wereda of 
South Omo has been submitted to the CoN claiming that Kara have been 
politically underrepresented in the wereda and zone administration structures.123 
In view of this, how should these claims be addressed? 
Article 39(3) of the FDRE Constitution seems to provide a starting ground for 
equitable representation.124 In light of this, how is the issue of equitable and 
effective participation being addressed in the SNNP region? Three points are 
worth mentioning in order to understand the region‟s approach to the dilemma.  
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 See, the FDRE Constitution, Art 39(3).  
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 Qebena are one of the native identities recognized in the Gurage zone along with Gurage 
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 See the application by Qebena to the CoN, (10/12/1997 E.C), on file with the registrar of 
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The first dilemma relates to ethnic groups to whom it was possible to grant 
and establish territorial autonomy, zones and liyu weredas. To an arguable 
extent, their demand to have effective participation, not only at the regional 
level, but also at the sub-regional levels seems to have been satisfied. Despite 
this, however, these sub-regional administrations have not been able to contain 
the quest for additional zones or liyu weredas and equitable representation 
within the sub-regional administrations themselves.125  
The second dilemma is the impossibility of ensuring territorial autonomy 
(TA) to all ethnic groups of the region 126 as a result of which the CoN was 
established. All the 56 native identities are represented in CoN 127 perhaps to 
counter the demand of every ethnic group for its own territory. 128 The CoN 
(being a House composed of the region‟s NNPs) was given important powers 
such as regulating disputes between the various ethnic groups, quest for 
administrative hierarchies and border disputes (between sub-regional 
administrations) 129 This, in some way, is assumed to have given decision-
making powers to all NNPs of the region so that they can take matters into their 
own hands.130  
The third dilemma is related with equitable representation although the 
region has arguably, ensured that the native identities are represented at the 
regional council.131 It is assumed that the representation of the NNPs has been 
guaranteed to enable them to take authority of what is going on at the regional 
level. But the concept of equitable representation in the region seems to be 
challenged by issues of both constitutional design and political practice.   
In terms of constitutional design, ethnic diversity is more pronounced in 
SNNP regional state than any of the other regions; and thus the adoption of 
majoritarian decision-making procedures at the CoN and regional council 132 
does not match, in particular, to the quest of ethnic minorities for effective 
                                           
125 
See the discussions under section three below. One can see the claims of the Qebena and 
Mareko in the Gurage zone and Kara in the South-Omo Zone. 
126 
See Aalen, supra note 15, p. 101. 
127 
See, the SNNP Constitution, Art. 58. The rule of representation is: more populous groups 
will have the higher number of representatives in the council. In spite of this, an ethnic 
group, no matter how small it might be, is at least guaranteed a seat. 
128
 In fact one of the important powers of the CoN, as per Art 59(4) of the SNNP 
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participation. It is to be noted that the electoral system of first-past-the-post (that 
was used to elect members of the regional council) makes the representation of 
ethnic minorities difficult where electoral constituencies are established on 
ethnic basis.133 Moreover, the use of a language proficiency requirement for 
political candidature puts additional barriers for equitable representation, if any, 
for ethnic minorities living outside of their designated ethnic territories.134 
Looking at the political practice, the region that is being overwhelmingly 
ruled by the Southern Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Movement (SEPDM) –the 
region‟s ruling party since its inception– does not and cannot seem to operate 
outside of the wishes of the party. A strong caveat has to be put for this 
statement. The portrayal of the days considering EPRDF and SEPDM –one of its 
constituent members– as ones which exhibit strong party discipline with 
centralist decision-making tendencies seems to be long gone. Especially, after 
strong anti-government social movements that shook the country –since 
September 2015– the core nature of EPRDF and thereby SEPDM have been 
significantly altered. Yet, one can argue that the party‟s firmly held priority of 
administrative integration within the region has undermined the desire by ethnic 
groups for additional zones and liyu weredas.135  
However, recent developments reveal that the region seems to be heading 
towards an all out administrative disintegration. SEPDM has already approved 
the demand by Sidama for a separate regional status and the additional 
establishment of ethnically based sub-regional administrations.136 While many 
ethnic groups have followed suit and requested for the establishment of either 
their own separate region or territorial administration,137 the region stands at 
crossroads between respecting and implementing the constitutional promises on 
accommodation of diversity, on the one hand and the desire to avoid ethnic and 
territorial fragmentations, on the other. 
4. Between Rhetoric and Practice: In Search of Middle Ground? 
In view of the various petitions, the pressing issue is, whether rhetoric 
(constitutional promises) are put into practice. And above all, how can the ever-
increasing demands for identity recognition and SD claims be reconciled with 
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the threats of territorial and ethnic fragmentations. The Silte case, which relied 
on the definition of ethnic groups under Article 39(5), is, arguably, the closest 
that came to understanding and responding to claims for recognizing separate 
identities. It is difficult to argue that this provision was initially intended to 
respond to these kinds of demands. There appears no indication including in the 
preparatory document of the FDRE Constitution that the drafters foresaw a 
problem of this nature and included a constitutional remedy for it.  
With respect to SD claims, Article 39 of both the FDRE Constitution and 
SNNP Constitution, state that NNPs have the right to administer themselves 
within a defined territory. And no clawback clause, like administrative 
efficiency, is found in these constitutions, or in other subordinate legislations.138 
If so, what can we make of the decision of the CoN to deny the Konso zonal 
request on the basis of administrative efficacy? Of course, there is a need to 
balance between the right of NNPs to preserve their identity and establish 
institutions of self-rule with that of ethnic and territorial fragmentations. But, 
that should not be done at the expense of undermining the identity and SD rights 
of ethnic groups. 
The political practice seems very clear in this regard. The federal government 
has several times unequivocally stated that all ethnic based questions have been 
constitutionally answered –what remains is simply rent-seeking local elites 
trying to exploit the masses for their personal gains.139 The ruling party of the 
SNNP region has previously made its policy clear on questions of administrative 
hierarchy. As Aalen noted:  
“requests for new zone or special wereda administrations would … be 
considered from a purely administrative perspective, … clearly separated 
from the right of the nationalities to self-determination. Groups could no 
longer simply argue that recognition of a separate ethnic identity 
automatically gave them the right to a separate administration”.140 
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With respect to equitable participation in the region, regardless of the 
stipulations under the federal and SNNP constitutions, the notion of ethnic 
ownership of territory and its government institutions by the titular ethnic groups 
does not seem to fade anytime soon. In fact, the problem is that the titular group 
has no incentive to share its privileges with the non-titular group. For those 
territorially concentrated ethnic minorities found bordering their ethnic kin and 
denied of equitable participation, petitioning for territorial re-demarcations seem 
the only solution so far. There appears no available political solution to 
territorially dispersed ethnic minorities. 
The HoF and CoN do not seem to take into account the various time limits in 
settling the claims irrespective of the claims presented although some of these 
claims are as old as the federal arrangement. In fact, they seem to be managing 
most of the petitions by not responding. The time limits provided by the various 
laws have simply fallen into oblivion and have also not helped in holding these 
institutions accountable.   
There is indeed the need to examine measures that can or should be taken to 
tackle the dilemma of reconciling the tension between fragmenting identities and 
territory with the desire for maintaining territorial and ethnic unity. Perhaps, one 
mechanism of responding to ethnic based demands, especially in circumstances 
of extreme ethnic plurality, is to separate ethnic rights from territorial claims. 
The respect and protection of ethnic based demands does not necessarily have to 
be dealt by the granting of territorial autonomy alone.  
Hence, the recognition of ethnic identity should not automatically mean 
ethnic autonomy. This primarily avoids the territorialization of ethnicities. The 
setback, however, is: this is in direct disagreement with what the FDRE 
Constitution says about ethnic rights –that ethnic groups have the (unrestricted) 
right to ethnically defined territories. While it may be necessary to qualify in the 
Constitution, which ethnic rights lead to territorial claims –possibly through 
constitutional amendment– non-territorial mechanisms of accommodating 
minorities should also be employed to offer legal and institutional responses to 
the ever-increasing claims of ethnic groups.141  
Another mechanism could be the strengthening of citizenship rights, 
conceivably through the strict enforcement of Bill of Rights, ensuring that 
members of minority communities shall and will not be subjected to 
marginalization and second-class treatment as a result of the ethnicization of 
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territories.142 While the respect for ethnic rights forms the cornerstone of ethnic 
federalism, such shall not be allowed to propagate new platforms of 
discrimination and undermine the rights of minorities that seek to redress past 
injustices with present retributions.143 The strict enforcement of Bill of Rights is 
understood to put to check exclusionary attitudes of dominant groups as against 
their minorities. By encouraging the idea of an overarching common citizenship 
geared towards building a common political identity, it is argued that it is 
possible to counter or moderate the exclusionary tendencies of ethnic 
empowerment and the „politics of difference’.  
Competing ethno-nationalisms, as is the case in many federations, have been 
mitigated with nuanced approaches of consociational power sharing between 
contending groups.144 This kind of power sharing has offered, arguably, some of 
the best institutional solutions to many ethnic conflicts.145 While regional and 
sub-regional units in Ethiopia are visibly heterogeneous, they have practically 
been treated as though they were homogenous. For what it is worse, they have 
been bestowed to select ethnic groups as properties, which consider them as their 
exclusive dominions.146 This has made it extremely difficult to implement and 
institutionalize any form of power sharing, as elites from dominant groups, in 
many circumstances, often find no incentive to share territories they consider 
their own.147 Despite the various rights of minority groups that are embodied in 
the federal and regional constitutions, one of their major limitations is the failure 
to institutionalize a mechanism by which “the constituent minorities could 
genuinely share power and be effectively represented in the institutions of the 
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national and, as appropriate, subnational governments respectively”.148 There is 
ample evidence, now in Ethiopia, to show that this problem has to be addressed 
at a constitutional level. 
Dominant ethnic groups in Ethiopia have used territorial autonomy not only 
to advance their rights, but also to suppress their internal minorities. This, inter 
alia, requires giving power to the central government to intervene when the 
position of internal minorities is compromised and whenever local authorities 
are either unable or unwilling to remedy it.149 This power of intervention should 
be seen distinctly from strict federal intervention or declarations of state of 
emergencies, which are ordered when there is a general deterioration of peace 
and order. Rather, the power of the central government to intervene in this case 
is made exclusively when regional majorities undermine the position of regional 
minorities. Moreover, the continuity of ethnic autonomy should also be made 
dependent, among others, on a satisfactory evaluation of the treatment of its 
minorities. The formation of new ethnic territorial arrangement has to also be 
contingent on the existence of sufficient legal and institutional guarantees to 
those that will become minorities upon the creation of the new arrangement.   
Conclusion  
Undoubtedly, claims to identity recognition and self determination (SD) have 
been a severe test, not only for the region of SNNP, but also for the overall 
federal dispensation. Clearly, the constitutional architecture, both at the federal 
and regional levels, bestows extensive space for groups to organize under 
distinct identities and seek separate ethnic territorial administrations. More than 
any other time, the manner in which identity and SD claims are to be handled in 
the SNNP region has become extremely sensitive. The increase or otherwise of 
the number of politically recognized ethnic groups and their respective ethnic 
territorial administrations requires cautious decisions.  
The regional government‟s stubborn stance against identity and self 
determination (SD) claims has in fact made petitions for them to proliferate. 
Undoubtedly, these claims will continue to increase and seriously test the 
resilience of the Ethiopian federal structure unless the political apparatus 
delicately balances the constitutional rights to identity recognition and SD with 
that of the threat of ethnic and territorial fragmentations.                                     ■   
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